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Reducing incentive constraints in bidimensional screening

Braulio Calagua

Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design2023https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.005article
AJG 1
Weight
0.26

What the paper says

This paper studies screening problems with quasilinear preferences, where agents' private information is two-dimensional and the allocation instrument is one-dimensional. We define a preorder to compare types based on their marginal valuation to the instrument, which facilitates the reduction of incentive compatibility constraints that must be checked. With this approach, the discretized problem becomes computationally tractable. As an application, we numerically solve a problem introduced by Lewis & Sappington (1988)

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.005

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@article{braulio2023,
  title        = {{Reducing incentive constraints in bidimensional screening}},
  author       = {Braulio Calagua},
  journal      = {Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design},
  year         = {2023},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.005},
}

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Reducing incentive constraints in bidimensional screening

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Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.