Public good provision with a governor

Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar et al.

Mathematical Social Sciences2026https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102525preprint
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We study a public good game with N citizens and a Governor who allocates resources from a common fund. Citizens may voluntarily contribute or be compelled to do so if audited, in which case shirkers face a penalty. The Governor decides how much of the fund to devote to public good provision, with the remainder embezzled. Crucially, the Governor's utility combines material payoffs from embezzlement with belief-dependent reputational concerns. We fully characterize the symmetric subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) of the game. The model always admits at least one pure-strategy equilibrium, ranging from universal free-riding with complete embezzlement to full contribution with efficient provision. Mixed-strategy equilibria exist only in a narrow region of parameter values and may involve multiple equilibria. Our analysis highlights the roles of penalties, audits, and reputational incentives in sustaining contribution and provision, thereby linking public good provision with the broader literature on corruption, embezzlement, and psychological game theory.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102525

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@article{chowdhury2026,
  title        = {{Public good provision with a governor}},
  author       = {Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar et al.},
  journal      = {Mathematical Social Sciences},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102525},
}

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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