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The museum pass problem with consortia

Juan Carlos Gonçalves-Dosantos et al.

International Journal of Game Theory2026https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-00989-zarticle
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.50

Abstract

In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation mechanisms based on the market structure and the principles of proportionality and egalitarianism. Each mechanism satisfies a distinct set of reasonable properties related to fairness and stability, which serve to axiomatically characterize them.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-00989-z

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@article{juan2026,
  title        = {{The museum pass problem with consortia}},
  author       = {Juan Carlos Gonçalves-Dosantos et al.},
  journal      = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-00989-z},
}

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The museum pass problem with consortia

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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