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Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected Set of commodities: A limit theorem

Francesca Busetto et al.

Games and Economic Behavior2026https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.003preprint
AJG 3ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

We consider a mixed version of the Shapley window model, where large traders are represented as atoms and small traders are represented by an atomless part. Our main theorem shows that any sequence of Cournot-Nash allocations of the strategic market games associated with the partial replications of the exchange economy has a limit point for each trader and that the assignment determined by these limit points is a Walrasian allocation of the original economy. Instead of relying on restrictive assumptions on the characteristics of atoms, as in Busetto et al. (2017), our limit theorem relies on the characteristics of agents in the atomless part and their endogenously price-taking behavior.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.003

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@article{francesca2026,
  title        = {{Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected Set of commodities: A limit theorem}},
  author       = {Francesca Busetto et al.},
  journal      = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.003},
}

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Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected Set of commodities: A limit theorem

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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