Cross‐ownership and environmental R&D risk choices in a differentiated duopoly
LI Dong-dong et al.
Abstract
This paper develops a differentiated duopoly model to investigate the optimal environmental R&D (ER&D) risk choices of firms with cross‐ownership under an emission tax. The results show that when firms hold shares in each other, cross‐ownership incentivizes firms to undertake greater ER&D risks. The private incentive for ER&D risk is lower than the social incentive when the emission tax rate is low relative to the marginal environmental damage. However, a higher share of cross‐ownership can bring the private optimum closer to the social optimum under certain conditions. We also find that under unilateral shareholding, a firm partially owned by its rival assumes higher ER&D risk than the firm owning its shares, but both take on less risk than under cross‐ownership. Finally, we show that ER&D risk is higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition.
2 citations
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.25 × 0.4 = 0.10 |
| M · momentum | 0.55 × 0.15 = 0.08 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
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