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All politics is local: Corporate political power and the award of federal contracts

Reza Houston et al.

Contemporary Economic Policy2026https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.70032article
AJG 2ABDC B
Weight
0.50

Abstract

Political power in political economy lacks standardized metrics. This study introduces a measurement method combining individual legislators' power with firms' political contributions. This corporate political power measure explains federal contracting success. Results show local politicians representing firms' operational areas provide greater contracting benefits than powerful national politicians. Federal representatives support local firms to boost constituent employment and re‐election prospects. Additionally, firms strategically reallocate contributions toward more electable politicians when experiencing political power decline, demonstrating adaptive behavior in maintaining influence.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.70032

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@article{reza2026,
  title        = {{All politics is local: Corporate political power and the award of federal contracts}},
  author       = {Reza Houston et al.},
  journal      = {Contemporary Economic Policy},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.70032},
}

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All politics is local: Corporate political power and the award of federal contracts

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.