Biased recommendations and differentially informed consumers

Martin Peitz & Anton Sobolev

Economic Theory Bulletin2025https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-025-00292-2article
ABDC B
Weight
0.37

Abstract

We consider a monopolist selling a product to differentially informed consumers: some consumers are uncertain about their tastes, whereas other consumers are perfectly informed. The monopolist sets a uniform price and can make personalized product recommendations. We characterize conditions under which the monopolist biases its recommendations—that is, some consumers with values below the marginal cost follow the recommendation to buy the product or some consumers with values above the marginal cost follow the recommendation not to buy the product.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-025-00292-2

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@article{martin2025,
  title        = {{Biased recommendations and differentially informed consumers}},
  author       = {Martin Peitz & Anton Sobolev},
  journal      = {Economic Theory Bulletin},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-025-00292-2},
}

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Evidence weight

0.37

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06
M · momentum0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.