Overconfidence and strategic behavior in elimination contests: implications for CEO selection

Yuxi Chen & Luís Santos‐Pinto

Review of Economic Design2025https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-025-00381-5article
AJG 2ABDC B
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

Abstract We analyze how overconfidence affects behavior in multistage elimination contests. Our findings reveal a nuanced interplay between overconfidence and effort exertion. An overconfident player exerts less effort in the final stage than a rational rival. However, this pattern can be inverted in the semifinals stage, where an overconfident player can exert more effort than a rational rival. We also uncover that an overconfident player can have the highest probability of winning an elimination contest. Our results offer a novel perspective on CEO overconfidence and highlight that high executive compensation renders the pursuit of CEO positions exceptionally appealing to overconfident managers.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-025-00381-5

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@article{yuxi2025,
  title        = {{Overconfidence and strategic behavior in elimination contests: implications for CEO selection}},
  author       = {Yuxi Chen & Luís Santos‐Pinto},
  journal      = {Review of Economic Design},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-025-00381-5},
}

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Overconfidence and strategic behavior in elimination contests: implications for CEO selection

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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