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Multiple teams and the volunteer’s dilemma

Kai A. Konrad

Rationality and Society2025https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631251341703article
AJG 2ABDC B
Weight
0.44

What the paper says

We study the volunteer’s dilemma if the set of possible volunteers is partitioned into small teams that can coordinate internally but not across teams. If coordination is costless, the aggregate equilibrium payoff is determined by the number of teams only. The team size is relevant for individual players’ payoffs. They prefer larger teams. The optimality of the team structure is also considered if the coordination cost in teams is an increasing and strictly convex function of team size. Such costs can make very large teams suboptimal. Also, such costs suggest a partitioning into teams of roughly equal size.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631251341703

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@article{kai2025,
  title        = {{Multiple teams and the volunteer’s dilemma}},
  author       = {Kai A. Konrad},
  journal      = {Rationality and Society},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631251341703},
}

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Multiple teams and the volunteer’s dilemma

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Evidence weight

0.44

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.32 × 0.4 = 0.13
M · momentum0.57 × 0.15 = 0.09
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.