arbiter
JournalsAccount

Kantian Dynamics

Valentin Lacombe & Gianni Arioli

International Game Theory Review2025https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198925500069article
AJG 1ABDC B
Weight
0.50

Abstract

Kant’s categorical imperative states: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” Game Theory has recently borrowed this idea from moral philosophy to introduce a new driver in strategic decisions — a motivation that adds cooperation to selfish reasoning. This paper presents a model describing the dynamics of a population whose strategies evolve not only from selfish gain, as in the replicator dynamics, but also from a moral inclination toward cooperation. We apply our model to well-known game-theoretic problems.

Open via your library →

Cite this paper

https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198925500069

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{valentin2025,
  title        = {{Kantian Dynamics}},
  author       = {Valentin Lacombe & Gianni Arioli},
  journal      = {International Game Theory Review},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198925500069},
}

Paste directly into BibTeX, Zotero, or your reference manager.

Flag this paper

Kantian Dynamics

Flags are reviewed by the Arbiter methodology team within 5 business days.

Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.