Silence or Solidarity? The Political Pitfalls of an LGBTQI Avoidance Strategy in Hungary
Phillip M. Ayoub & Sam Whitt
Abstract
Amid rising illiberal anti-LGBTQI backlash, some opposition politicians fear that resisting it is a political trap that could jeopardize their electoral fortunes. We evaluate this concern in Hungary, where Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government passed a law banning Pride marches. The leading opposition figure, Péter Magyar of Tisza, initially avoided opposing the law, ostensibly to protect his party’s future electoral prospects. In a May 2025 survey experiment, we find that this “avoidance” strategy reduces Magyar’s approval while failing to increase support for his party. Theoretically, we conceptualize a value-credibility cost mechanism through which elite silence diminishes moral authority, cedes issue ownership, and weakens support for LGBTQI rights. Our results, buttressed by interviews with LGBTQI organizers, contribute to a literature on the costs and benefits of minority rights inclusion in electoral strategy.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.