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Evaluating University Graduates: Prestige Versus Merit

Raphael Boleslavsky & Cheng Li

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy2026https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.70025article
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We study a game in which universities compete by making unobservable investments in education quality. Subsequently, the graduates are considered for a single placement by an organization. A merit‐based evaluator compares the realized skill of each graduate. A prestige‐based evaluator only observes a noisy signal of the universities' relative education quality. Though a prestige‐based evaluator does not know the true skills of the graduates, we derive conditions under which an increase in the probability of the prestige‐based evaluator incentivizes higher investment and benefits the organization.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.70025

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@article{raphael2026,
  title        = {{Evaluating University Graduates: Prestige Versus Merit}},
  author       = {Raphael Boleslavsky & Cheng Li},
  journal      = {Journal of Economics & Management Strategy},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.70025},
}

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.