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Delegation and Managerial Misreporting: The Role of Incentive Compensation Scheme and Trust in Superior

Universitas Hasanuddin & Muhammad Irdam Ferdiansah

Management Accounting Frontiers2023https://doi.org/10.52153/prj0531006article
AJG 1
Weight
0.26

What the paper says

This study investigates determinants of managers’ misreporting behaviour. Misreporting in this study is defined as managers’ action of withholding or misrepresenting information to their superior for their own benefit. Specifically, this study examines the relationship between delegation of decision rights and incentive compensation scheme on manager’s misreporting behaviour. Furthermore, this study examines the mediating role of incentive compensation scheme on the relationship of delegation of decision rights on manager’s misreporting behaviour. In addition, this study explores the potential informal control of trust in superior in deterring delegated managers engaging in misreporting behaviour. The results from a survey of 145 managers who reside in U.S. show that delegation of decision rights affect manager’s misreporting behaviour directly and indirectly through incentive compensation scheme. Moreover, the results show that trust in superior negatively moderates the relationship between delegation of decision rights and manager’s misreporting behaviour, indicating that high trust in superior can be used as informal control to deter managerial misreporting behaviour.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.52153/prj0531006

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@article{universitas2023,
  title        = {{Delegation and Managerial Misreporting: The Role of Incentive Compensation Scheme and Trust in Superior}},
  author       = {Universitas Hasanuddin & Muhammad Irdam Ferdiansah},
  journal      = {Management Accounting Frontiers},
  year         = {2023},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.52153/prj0531006},
}

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Delegation and Managerial Misreporting: The Role of Incentive Compensation Scheme and Trust in Superior

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Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.