A festschrift for Vince Crawford
Alexander Teytelboym
What the paper says
T he five papers in this festschrift that celebrates the 75th birthday of Vincent P. Crawford (henceforth "Vince") attempt to reflect a mere fraction of his monumental contributions to economic theory.This special issue of the Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design touches on just three of Vince's earlier research interests-social choice, information economics, and matching markets-which led to unforgettable papers pored over by generations of first-year graduate students as well as by more seasoned connoisseurs.The issue only scratches the surface of the many areas in which Vince has made long-lasting contributions-for example, his work has also been fundamental in bargaining and arbitration, learning, contract theory, evolutionary game theory, and, more recently, level- thinking.But Vince deserves multiple festschrifts and this is only the first one.Some of Vince's earliest published work was on social choice 1 and specifically looked at the possibility for self-administered procedures (rather than mechanisms run by the social planner) to get to Pareto-efficient and "fair" allocations.The poignant first paper in the issue reflects Vince's early interest in social choice."Kenneth Arrow's Last Theorem" by Paul Milgrom describes I am very grateful to Zaifu Yang for inviting me to be a guest editor for this special issue and to Pter Bir for organizing the 2024 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design where we celebrated Vince's birthday.I want to thank Scott Kominers
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.