arbiter
JournalsAccount

Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Prompt Corrective Action

Juha-Pekka Niinimäki

Finnish Economic Papers2012article
ABDC B
Weight
0.26

Abstract

The paper investigates the optimal design of bank bailouts in economies where banks can hide loan losses, and focuses on banking regulation via two Prompt Corrective Action instruments: prohibition of dividends and early closure policy. The first has a mitigating effort on moral hazard and regulator’s costs but the second instrument has a damaging impact. As to bad debts and the cleaning of banks’ balance sheets, asset insurance for the bank’s loan portfolio, bank capital and prohibition of dividends motivate banks to disclose loan losses.

Cite this paper

@article{juha-pekka2012,
  title        = {{Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Prompt Corrective Action}},
  author       = {Juha-Pekka Niinimäki},
  journal      = {Finnish Economic Papers},
  year         = {2012},
}

Paste directly into BibTeX, Zotero, or your reference manager.

Flag this paper

Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Prompt Corrective Action

Flags are reviewed by the Arbiter methodology team within 5 business days.

Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.