The Problem of Apparently Irrational AI

Jacob Browning & Mark Theunissen

Philosophy of the Social Sciences2026https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931261418166article
ABDC B
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

Contemporary AI confronts us with a puzzle: how can such impressive language models behave in such apparently irrational ways? Social scientists have long struggled with a similar puzzle when studying other cultures: how should we understand strange behavior—and is it ever appropriate to regard it as irrational? In this paper, we argue that pragmatic, pluralist approaches developed in the social sciences to address these issues are useful for understanding language models. Moreover, we contend these approaches help us grasp when it is appropriate to regard behavior as irrational and better explained in non-rational terms.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931261418166

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@article{jacob2026,
  title        = {{The Problem of Apparently Irrational AI}},
  author       = {Jacob Browning & Mark Theunissen},
  journal      = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931261418166},
}

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The Problem of Apparently Irrational AI

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.