From Murphy to Monopolies: Rethinking State Online Sports Betting Regulation

Jonathan Schachter

Columbia Business Law Review2026https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2025i2.14673article
ABDC A
Weight
0.50

Abstract

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. NCAA invalidated the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, states have assumed exclusive authority over the regulation of sports betting. This decentralization has produced a highly fragmented regulatory landscape, particularly in the online sports betting market, where some states permit robust competition among numerous operators while others affirmatively sanction monopolies or highly concentrated markets. These state-level choices interact with an already concentrated national market dominated by DraftKings and FanDuel, creating significant variation in consumer choice, pricing, and regulatory outcomes across jurisdictions. This Note examines the sources and consequences of market power in online sports betting, distinguishing between naturally occurring national concentration and state-created intra-state market power. It situates state-sanctioned monopolies within the broader theoretical framework of “justified monopolies,” drawing comparisons to industries such as alcohol distribution, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and securities markets. Although proponents argue that monopolistic regulation can generate higher tax revenues, enhance consumer protection, and promote long-term innovation, this Note contends that online sports betting does not satisfy the conditions necessary to justify such market concentration. This Note argues that competitive online sports betting markets are better suited to advancing consumer welfare and regulatory goals than state-level monopolies. It further suggests that the current patchwork of state regimes risks distorting consumer behavior, reducing effective competition, and undermining potential gains from innovation. Drawing on the regulatory logic of Regulation National Market System in U.S. securities law, the Note proposes that competition—rather than state-imposed exclusivity—offers a more effective and adaptable framework for regulating online sports betting in the post-Murphy era.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2025i2.14673

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@article{jonathan2026,
  title        = {{From Murphy to Monopolies: Rethinking State Online Sports Betting Regulation}},
  author       = {Jonathan Schachter},
  journal      = {Columbia Business Law Review},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2025i2.14673},
}

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From Murphy to Monopolies: Rethinking State Online Sports Betting Regulation

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