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Regulatory Arbitrage and Initial Coin Offerings

Scott Fung et al.

European Financial Management2026https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.70049article
AJG 3ABDC A
Weight
0.50

Abstract

This study examines how crypto startups weigh regulatory exposure against the breadth of their investor base when raising capital through initial coin offerings. We find that high ex ante appeal projects strategically limit investor access. Excluding investors from regulated markets is associated with greater fundraising success and long‐term viability, even after controlling for project quality. These findings suggest that high‐appeal projects perceive regulatory costs as outweighing the benefits of a larger investor base. As a result, regulatory efforts may have the unintended consequence of deterring high‐appeal projects from raising capital from investors in regulated countries while encouraging low‐appeal ones.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.70049

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@article{scott2026,
  title        = {{Regulatory Arbitrage and Initial Coin Offerings}},
  author       = {Scott Fung et al.},
  journal      = {European Financial Management},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.70049},
}

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Regulatory Arbitrage and Initial Coin Offerings

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.