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A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem

Gian Caspari

Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design2023https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.003article
AJG 1
Weight
0.26

What the paper says

We study multi-category housing allocation problems: A finite set of objects, which is sorted into categories of equal size, has to be allocated to a finite set of individuals, such that everyone obtains exactly one object from each category. We show that, in the large class of category-wise neutral and non-bossy mechanisms, any strategy-proof mechanism can be constructed by simply letting individuals choose an object from each category one after another following some priority order. We refer to these mechanisms as multi-category serial dictatorships and advocate for selecting priority orders across categories as fairly as possible.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.003

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@article{gian2023,
  title        = {{A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem}},
  author       = {Gian Caspari},
  journal      = {Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design},
  year         = {2023},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.003},
}

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A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem

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Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.