← Back to results Board-Level Employee Representation and Risk Sharing Between Shareholders and Employees: Evidence from the German Codetermination Act of 1976 Julia Udoieva-Wagner & Marc Steffen Rapp
Abstract With increasing concerns about the accountability of shareholder-oriented boards, board-level employee representation (BLER) is gaining momentum in public debate. Although BLER is not a new idea, there is little consensus about its economic effects. Using the enactment of the German Codetermination Act of 1976 as a quasi-natural experiment, we document two consequences of BLER. First, labor expenses of firms become less responsive to revenue, specifically in sectors with high labor turnover rates. Second, BLER increases operating leverage of firms. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that BLER affects risk sharing between shareholders and employees.
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@article{julia2025,
title = {{Board-Level Employee Representation and Risk Sharing Between Shareholders and Employees: Evidence from the German Codetermination Act of 1976}},
author = {Julia Udoieva-Wagner & Marc Steffen Rapp},
journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics},
year = {2025},
doi = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2025-0025},
} TY - JOUR
TI - Board-Level Employee Representation and Risk Sharing Between Shareholders and Employees: Evidence from the German Codetermination Act of 1976
AU - Udoieva-Wagner, Julia
AU - Rapp, Marc Steffen
JO - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
PY - 2025
ER - Julia Udoieva-Wagner & Marc Steffen Rapp (2025). Board-Level Employee Representation and Risk Sharing Between Shareholders and Employees: Evidence from the German Codetermination Act of 1976. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2025-0025 Julia Udoieva-Wagner & Marc Steffen Rapp. "Board-Level Employee Representation and Risk Sharing Between Shareholders and Employees: Evidence from the German Codetermination Act of 1976." *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* (2025). https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2025-0025. Board-Level Employee Representation and Risk Sharing Between Shareholders and Employees: Evidence from the German Codetermination Act of 1976
Julia Udoieva-Wagner & Marc Steffen Rapp · Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics · 2025
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2025-0025 Copy
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