Incentive Mechanism in Port Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Blockchain and Contract Optimization
Jing Hu & Yonggang Zuo
What the paper says
The research findings indicate that the blockchain-induced optimization coefficient of logistics costs is positively associated with the wholesale prices of logistics capabilities. Conversely, it is negatively correlated with the unit service cost of carrier enterprises, as well as the profit of the port logistics service supply chain (LSSC). Both revenue-sharing contracts and quantity-flexibility contracts are capable of achieving the coordination of the port LSSC. The coordination condition is that the wholesale price of logistics capacity equals the unit service cost of carrier enterprises after blockchain-based optimization. These contracts enable flexible profit distribution within the port LSSC, thereby enhancing its overall coordination.
1 citation
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06 |
| M · momentum | 0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.