Regulatory Enforcement Actions and Short Selling

Dominique Outlaw & Anoop Rai

Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies2026https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219091526500013article
ABDC B
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

US federal regulators impose enforcement actions on banks when they discover breaches of fiduciary duty. We find that short sellers anticipate enforcement actions 6 months before issuance, regardless of the state of the economy. After the infractions are settled, short selling decreases for banks with certain characteristics. Further, we find that large banks face less scrutiny from short sellers ahead of enforcement actions, a potential benefit of being Too Big to Fail. These findings may suggest that short interest serves as a signal for declining bank quality ahead of a formal investigation and improving conditions after the settlement.

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Cite this paper

https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219091526500013

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{dominique2026,
  title        = {{Regulatory Enforcement Actions and Short Selling}},
  author       = {Dominique Outlaw & Anoop Rai},
  journal      = {Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219091526500013},
}

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.