Booster draft mechanisms for multi-object assignment

Gian Caspari

International Journal of Game Theory2026https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-00981-7article
AJG 2ABDC A
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0.50

Abstract

We describe a new class of mechanisms—referred to as booster draft mechanisms—for allocating $$n\times m$$ indivisible objects among n individuals with responsive preferences . Specifically, n individuals are assigned m objects each, from m different sets of size n —called boosters—and simply receive their highest ranked object, among the remaining objects in each booster, when it is their turn to choose. We contrast booster draft mechanisms with two well-known alternatives: serial dictatorship and draft mechanisms. Our results suggest that booster draft mechanisms pose a viable alternative for resolving multi-object assignment problems.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-00981-7

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@article{gian2026,
  title        = {{Booster draft mechanisms for multi-object assignment}},
  author       = {Gian Caspari},
  journal      = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-00981-7},
}

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