Corruption-related provisions in East and South Asian investment agreements: an empirical analysis
Nobumichi Teramura & Luke Nottage
Abstract
This article analyses two types of provisions relevant to corruption in Asian international investment agreements (IIAs): clauses requiring (host) states to enforce anti-corruption laws and clauses that protect foreign investments made in accordance with host state laws. It tests whether IIA drafters act rationally regarding such clauses, or instead show status quo or other biases. This is complex first because rational strategies should depend on whether the state is a net exporter of foreign direct investment (FDI) or a net importer, but we explain how determining this status may be difficult. Secondly, rational strategies should depend on the relative extent of corruption in each state and, somewhat relatedly, the extent of inbound FDI claims. Despite such complexities and some instances of more ‘bounded’ rationality, overall states seem to be drafting both types of clauses rationally—even, and indeed especially, the net-FDI-importing states that tend to be transitioning economies. Adding to that empirical result from a more normative perspective, the article helps identify factors that could or should be considered by future IIA drafters, international bodies, or others tracking the trajectories of IIAs and corruption in Asia and beyond.
1 citation
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06 |
| M · momentum | 0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.