arbiter
JournalsAccount

Attracting Multinational Firms and Transfer Pricing

Hideki Sato

International Journal of Development and Conflict2018article
ABDC B
Weight
0.26

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that by providing favourable corporate tax rates, developing countries create incentives for corporate tax evasion. We will demonstrate further that the subsequent tightening of penalties to prevent such evasions has no effect. When corporate tax rates are lower in the country of production than they are in the country of sale, multinational firms possess an incentive to conduct illegal transfer pricing. Furthermore, attempts to strengthen penalties imposed on illegal transfer pricing, within the country of either production or sale, proves counterproductive. As a result, we argue that the governments of developing countries should take into consideration the issue of tax evasion by means of transfer pricing and should provide in-kind services rather than favourable tax rates to attract multinational firms.

Cite this paper

@article{hideki2018,
  title        = {{Attracting Multinational Firms and Transfer Pricing}},
  author       = {Hideki Sato},
  journal      = {International Journal of Development and Conflict},
  year         = {2018},
}

Paste directly into BibTeX, Zotero, or your reference manager.

Flag this paper

Attracting Multinational Firms and Transfer Pricing

Flags are reviewed by the Arbiter methodology team within 5 business days.

Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.