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Cross-State Strategic Voting

Gordon B. Dahl et al.

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy2026https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20240630article
AJG 3ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We estimate that 3.1 percent of US voters, or 6.1 million individuals, were registered to vote in two states in 2020, opening up the possibility for them to choose where to vote. Double registrants are concentrated in the wealthiest zip codes and respond to both incentives and costs, disproportionately choosing to vote in swing states (higher incentive) and states that automatically send out mail-in ballots (lower cost). We call this behavior Cross-State Strategic Voting. While others have documented strategic incentives on who to vote for, this paper is the first to consider strategic incentives on where to vote. (JEL D63, D72, K16)

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20240630

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@article{gordon2026,
  title        = {{Cross-State Strategic Voting}},
  author       = {Gordon B. Dahl et al.},
  journal      = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20240630},
}

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Cross-State Strategic Voting

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.