Reciprocity and Social Norms: Short- and Long-Run Crowding Out Effects of Financial Incentives

Jinhua Zhao et al.

Frontiers of Economics in China2021https://doi.org/10.54605/fec20210202article
ABDC C
Weight
0.34

What the paper says

We link the reciprocity model of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) with the theory of normative social behavior to study how financial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation in both the short and long runs. Using data from a lab-based repeated public goods game, we find strong evidence in support of the reciprocity model and crowding out effects both when the payment is in place and after it stops. When the payment program is in place, subjects become less sensitive to reciprocity, perceive less kindness in others’ contributions, and care less about others’ welfare. The overall decrease in motivation to reciprocate reduces the effectiveness of the payment program by almost 50%. About 20% of the crowding out effect persists after the payment stops, and the reciprocity mechanism explains over three quarters of the long-run crowding out effect.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.54605/fec20210202

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@article{jinhua2021,
  title        = {{Reciprocity and Social Norms: Short- and Long-Run Crowding Out Effects of Financial Incentives}},
  author       = {Jinhua Zhao et al.},
  journal      = {Frontiers of Economics in China},
  year         = {2021},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.54605/fec20210202},
}

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Evidence weight

0.34

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.80 × 0.15 = 0.12
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.