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Dynamic Contracting

Alessandro Pavan

Annual Review of Economics2026https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080525-114300article
AJG 3ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

Dynamic contracting plays a central role in many environments—for instance, in the sale of goods and services to consumers whose preferences evolve through learning, experimentation, or habit formation; in the taxation of workers whose productivity changes with learning-by-doing; in the provision of services on platforms with stochastic entry and exit of buyers and sellers; and in the matching of agents whose values and attractiveness are gradually revealed through past interactions. This article surveys several strands of the recent dynamic mechanism design literature, distills a few lessons, and points to promising directions for future research.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080525-114300

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@article{alessandro2026,
  title        = {{Dynamic Contracting}},
  author       = {Alessandro Pavan},
  journal      = {Annual Review of Economics},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080525-114300},
}

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Dynamic Contracting

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.