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Regulatory Contestability and Cost Pass-Through

Dennis L. Weisman

The BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy2025https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2024-0379article
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.37

What the paper says

Regulatory contestability posits that the threat of economic regulation disciplines pricing even in the absence of explicit regulatory mechanisms (e.g., cost-of-service regulation or price cap regulation). Formal modeling and numerical simulations reveal how regulatory contestability interacts with cost-reducing effort to limit the pass-through of costs. This may suggest that under certain conditions regulatory contestability can substitute for explicit regulatory mechanisms and potentially reduce the cost of regulation.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2024-0379

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@article{dennis2025,
  title        = {{Regulatory Contestability and Cost Pass-Through}},
  author       = {Dennis L. Weisman},
  journal      = {The BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2024-0379},
}

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Regulatory Contestability and Cost Pass-Through

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Evidence weight

0.37

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06
M · momentum0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.