Beyond armed and unarmed: political parties and violent institutions during a peace process

Abstract

Purpose This study aims to examine how political parties actively determine the enforcement of informal institutions of violence during peace processes, addressing whether governing parties shape coercive informal norms that perpetuate civil war or foster conflict management. Design/methodology/approach Using spatial panel regression, pooled ordinary least squares and fixed effects models, the study analyses how 19 active political parties and Significant Groups of Citizens enforced informal coercive institutions across 1,122 Colombian municipalities during the FARC-EP peace process (2011–2020). Brutality is measured through composite indicators considering fatal and non-fatal violence during executive tenure periods. Findings Results provide nuanced support for hypotheses. Parties with armed origins demonstrate increased brutality levels, whilst traditional parties show minimal effects. Unexpectedly, ethnic and personalistic parties consistently reduce violence rather than armed-linked parties driving all brutality. Paramilitary presence systematically amplifies brutality across governmental levels, whilst voter turnout reduces violence and electoral fraud increases it. Effects vary significantly between mayoral, gubernatorial and presidential contexts. Originality/value This research advances institutional theory by conceptualising “brutality” as a distinct informal institution and demonstrating that party-violence relationships extend beyond simple armed/non-armed distinctions. It reveals that parties with clear institutional legitimacy sources and bounded constituencies face stronger incentives for violence restraint due to accountability mechanisms from specific support bases, refining understanding of how formal political authority interacts with informal violent institutions during conflict resolution processes.