Why Do Eastern African Countries Comply With OECD Tax Norms? How Network Effects Shape Policy Transfer in Anti‐Profit Shifting Governance
Cassandra Vet & Abebe Gebrehiwot Yihdego
What the paper says
Widespread investments in OECD‐style transfer‐pricing audits across Sub‐Saharan Africa stand in contrast to critiques that question the effectiveness and legitimacy of the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. Our process tracing design aims to explain why Sub‐Saharan countries comply with OECD transfer‐pricing guidelines by tracing why some African countries implement transfer‐pricing audits while others do not. By comparing Kenya's, Uganda's, and Rwanda's compliance with Ethiopia's mock compliance, it reveals conditions supporting the implementation of suboptimal global standards. Drawing on historical institutionalist theory, we show that network effects create a compatibility advantage, enabling governments to increase revenue without undermining competitiveness. However, Ethiopia's approach is performative, and our findings emphasize two key conditions for compliance: the socialization of tax administrations into the transnational tax governance network influencing their policy feedback, and the presence and relative power of the financial service industry providing transfer‐pricing advice.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.