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Cost Hetrogeneity and Strategic Divisionalization

Kazumichi Iwasa & Toru Kikuchi

Kobe University Economic Review2007preprint
ABDC C
Weight
0.26

What the paper says

In this note, we consider a simple duopoly environment in which two parent firms compete in a market. We assume that there are cost differentials between these two parent firms. The parent firms' choices of divisionalization are modeled as a two-stage game. It will be shown that the number of divisions of a parent firm with a cost advantage (i.e., lower marginal costs) is relatively large. The results imply that the cost advantage of one parent firm will be magnified through divisionalization decisions.

Cite this paper

@article{kazumichi2007,
  title        = {{Cost Hetrogeneity and Strategic Divisionalization}},
  author       = {Kazumichi Iwasa & Toru Kikuchi},
  journal      = {Kobe University Economic Review},
  year         = {2007},
}

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Cost Hetrogeneity and Strategic Divisionalization

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Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.