Iran's Grand Strategy: A Political History. By ValiNasr, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2025. xiv + 388 pp. $35.00. ISBN: 978‐0‐69‐126892‐7

Abstract

Vali Nasr's latest book Iran's Grand Strategy: A Political History reframes the Islamic Republic's security strategy as a coherent political principle that has shaped state-building and social order, rather than as a disparate set of diplomatic and military doctrines. Through a detailed analysis of Iran's security environment and the interplay between foreign policy and domestic politics, Nasr demonstrates that policy choices—often labeled externally as “irrational and self-defeating” products of religious ideology—are, in fact, grounded in a consistent internal logic. The book's central question concerns why Iran has maintained an anti-American posture of resistance despite the high costs of sanctions and international isolation. Nasr attributes this persistence to a strategic culture of resistance, which he contends has guided foreign policy, politicized elite struggles, legitimized governance, and structured economic and social management, thereby forming the backbone of state-building. He substantiates this argument by systematically tracing the Islamic Republic's external conduct and domestic political conflicts as manifestations of a grand strategy governed by consistent logic. The first half of the book (Chapters 1–5) analyzes the historical experiences embedded in the leadership's collective memory that shaped Iran's strategic culture. Nasr argues that British and Russian interventions since the nineteenth century, combined with the Pahlavi monarchy's reliance on the United States during the Cold War, fostered a strong commitment to independence among revolutionary leaders. Thus, the 1979 Islamic Revolution is presented not simply as a regime change, but as a pivotal moment for institutionalizing the belief that genuine independence and liberation from US influence could be achieved through the establishment of national security. Nasr further contends that economic development was subsequently conceptualized within this overarching framework. Nasr highlights the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) as a “crucible” that forged a strategic culture of “perpetual resistance” (Chapters 4–5). Supported by widespread enthusiasm for revolutionary ideals, Khomeini's Iran institutionalized a resistance ethos, derived from the Karbala paradigm, as the ideological foundation for both security strategy and state governance. Nasr identifies this period as the emergence of a regional strategic vision, with the concept of expanding Iran's military presence toward the Levant via Iraq forming a prototype for the forward defense strategy later implemented through proxy forces and underpinning the “axis of resistance.” The broader implication is that national security and revolutionary ideology became deeply intertwined during this era, shaping the security worldview of the “war generation” that now dominates the leadership. A particularly compelling analysis is found in the middle chapters (Chapters 6–9), where Nasr examines changes in Iran's foreign policy decision-making under Khamenei period (1989–present). He argues that during the postwar period of relative social stability, elite conflict centered on the dichotomy of “reform or resistance.” Reformists promoted pragmatic diplomacy to enhance external relations and support economic development, while conservatives feared the diminishing appeal of revolutionary ideology and the growth of economic discontent. Consequently, conservatives mobilized resistance as an ideal to promote social justice and demonstrate national resilience. Nasr asserts that the 2003 US invasion of Iraq accelerated the institutionalization of forward defense through proxy forces, fundamentally reshaping Iran's policy-making process. As proxies expanded their influence throughout the Middle East and Iran's security environment improved, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as the primary actor on the “battlefield” (maydan), came to dominate the foreign policy bureaucracy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and marginalize reformist forces associated with professional diplomacy. Conservatives and the IRGC capitalized on heightened tensions resulting from confrontational foreign policy to justify this strategy as a governing doctrine, while also advancing a “resistance economy” by securitizing the economic sphere under sanctions. Consequently, Nasr argues that pursuing sanctions relief through improved external relations became institutionally constrained, with the resulting costs increasingly borne by society. Another chapter examines how the nuclear program, through diplomatic negotiations and domestic political conflict, became another pillar of Iran's resistance strategy (Chapter 10). Nasr contends that, although the program originated under the Pahlavi monarchy, Iraq's use of chemical weapons during the Iran–Iraq War heightened Iranian interest in nuclear capabilities. The divide between reformists—who sought to leverage the nuclear program to ease sanctions through negotiation—and conservatives—who advocated for the maximal expansion of the program as a symbol of resistance and national power—intensified during the negotiations and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) era. Following the Trump administration's unilateral withdrawal and “maximum pressure” policy, conservatives skeptical of negotiations gained dominance. According to Nasr, Iran then pursued a more assertive approach, combining accelerated nuclear development, strengthened forward defense to expel US military presence from the region, and deeper cooperation with Eurasian partners, including China and Russia, as part of its “Look East Policy.” The chapter's central implication is that the negotiation process itself was repeatedly integrated into domestic politics to legitimate the strategic culture of resistance. In the final chapter (Chapter 11), Nasr argues that, amid prolonged economic stagnation under sanctions, an anti-American security strategy centered on resistance is increasingly losing social support. Citing the recent nationwide protests of 2022 (“Woman, Life, Freedom” Movement), he emphasizes that Iranian society, particularly among younger generations, is less able to identify with the war experiences and resistance-based strategic culture that created the 1980s. In conclusion, Nasr reiterates that modern Iranian state-building, extending beyond the Islamic Republic, has historically been achieved through the establishment of national security. However, he contends that a strategy centered on resistance now limits the range of policy options in both domestic and foreign contexts. The central question, he concludes, is whether the regime can transcend a doctrinaire approach rooted in revolutionary ideology and adapt flexibly to a changing security environment. This capacity will be a critical test in future crises. This book makes a significant contribution to the study of Iranian politics by elucidating Iran's guiding logic from the perspective of its own strategic rationality. However, several issues remain. Notably, the book does not fully analyze how the components of Iran's multilayered deterrence posture—such as forward deterrence with proxies, missile defense, and nuclear development—function as complementary or substitutable instruments, nor how they are systematically integrated into a unified strategy. Addressing this gap requires attention to both the substitutability of deterrent forces and the interests of political actors, as well as the justificatory mechanisms within the decision-making process. Additionally, the book's discussion of the institutionalization of the resistance strategy and the resulting “state–society rupture” raises further questions about why the regime has nonetheless maintained a degree of resilience. While Nasr frames resistance as a principle of state-building, the specific institutional mechanisms that contribute to regime durability—such as mobilization, resource distribution, surveillance and repression, and elite cohesion—require further investigation. Future research should therefore reconceptualize the strategic culture of resistance not only as a driver of policy choice but also as an institutional technology of authoritarian governance. Finally, the book encourages a research agenda that addresses recent shifts in the Middle East. Because it was published before the security environment changes following the 12-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025, it does not address the consequences, particularly the long-term stability and reliability of proxy-based forward defense as a deterrent (Golkar 2025). Building on Nasr's argument, the memory of military confrontation and the destabilization of deterrence could prompt Iran to either fundamentally reconfigure its strategic culture or further entrench its resistance strategy. The key question for the future is which path the regime will pursue and how the political elite will legitimize it through domestic political processes. Nasr's book provides a crucial foundation for analyzing these developments.