Party inspection and its political function in China

Abstract

Field observations and interviews conducted during party inspections indicate that such inspections in China now prioritize political goals to uphold the leadership of the party centre and to ensure the obedience of subordinate party organs to the party centre in their daily work, as the anti-corruption function of the subordinate organs becomes secondary. The system of inspection has been institutionalized nationwide but retains flexibility for sudden and unexpected action in accordance with the will of the party centre. A set of indicators from the party centre defines inspection tasks to reflect its will, which local party committees further refine to guide both inspection teams and inspected units. Cost–benefit analyses reveal that the party committee, the inspection office, and inspection teams are all strongly motivated to conduct inspections effectively, although costs and benefits are unevenly distributed. The effectiveness of inspections largely depends on the frequency of routine inspections and the extent to which task indicators are reasonable and adaptable to the practical conditions of inspected units. Other influencing factors include the capacity of inspection teams, support from the local party committee for internal inspections, and the planning efforts of the inspection office. This article provides a detailed explanation of how inspections are conducted and how credibility is maintained.