Measurement, Race, and Anti-Realism

M.A. Diamond-Hunter

Philosophy of the Social Sciences2026https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931261418168article
ABDC B
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

Measurement of racial populations is commonplace in many social sciences, and metaphysical accounts for the reality of race implicitly assume race is real because measurements of racial populations are successful, and therefore are best explained by a realist account of race. This paper challenges the first premise in this implicit argument: measurements of race in the social sciences are not successful due to a number of epistemic issues with the use of race in social-scientific survey instruments. The paper concludes by pointing towards a metaphysical solution that does not assume that empirical measures of race are coherent.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931261418168

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@article{m.a.2026,
  title        = {{Measurement, Race, and Anti-Realism}},
  author       = {M.A. Diamond-Hunter},
  journal      = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931261418168},
}

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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