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Optimal Climate Policy in the Presence of Another Country’s Climate Policy

Kevin R. Kaushal

Strategic Behavior and the Environment2020https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000093article
AJG 1
Weight
0.26

What the paper says

The allowances in an emission trading system (ETS) are commonly allocated for free to the emission-intensive and trade-exposed sector, e.g., in the form of output-based allocation (OBA). Recently an approach combining OBA with a consumption tax has been proposed to mitigate carbon leakage. This paper evaluates the potential outcome in a game of climate policies, by examining the Nash equilibrium outcome of a non-cooperative policy instrument game between regions that regulate their emissions separately. We construct a computable general equilibrium model and investigate the case when regions can choose to supplement their ETS with OBA and/or with a consumption tax, in the presence of another regulating region. In the context of the EU and China, we show how regional interests combined with a national climate target, may lead to different climate policy combinations.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000093

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@article{kevin2020,
  title        = {{Optimal Climate Policy in the Presence of Another Country’s Climate Policy}},
  author       = {Kevin R. Kaushal},
  journal      = {Strategic Behavior and the Environment},
  year         = {2020},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000093},
}

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Optimal Climate Policy in the Presence of Another Country’s Climate Policy

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Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.