Delegative peacebuilding: Explaining post-conflict selective violence

Abstract

What explains selective violence against social and community leaders in the aftermath of war? This form of violence is often regarded as a spill-over product of wartime violence. We argue, however, that post-conflict selective violence occurs when the state delegates peacebuilding responsibilities to local leaders in areas of state weakness. Delegative peacebuilding describes a state's efforts to involve social and community leaders in peace programs in areas where its security apparatus or bureaucracy is weak or nonfunctional. Delegative peacebuilding mobilizes community leaders to implement state-led peace initiatives, making them focal points in the redistribution of power and resources. This positioning challenges the entrenched interests of local elites and armed groups, who often perceive these leaders as threats to their status as beneficiaries of the wartime status quo, thereby increasing their exposure to targeted violence. Our argument is grounded in immersive field research in Colombia, which has seen soaring levels of selective violence following the 2016 Peace Agreement. Employing a difference-in-differences design, we test the theory with original data on the assassination of social and community leaders (2014–2020).