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Inequality and Peer Punishment in a Common-Pool Resource Experiment

Lawrence R. De Geest & David C. Kingsley

Strategic Behavior and the Environment2021https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000099article
AJG 1
Weight
0.43

What the paper says

We test the effect of inequality on peer punishment in a common-pool resource (CPR) experiment with equal endowments (Equal) or unequal endowments (Unequal). Peer punishment reduces extractions in both treatments, but it is more effective in Unequal. Subjects with lower endowments coordinated around an Equal Earnings norm, subjects with higher endowments matched, and peer punishment tightened this coordinate-and-match dynamic. By contrast, there was less coordination in Equal, and as a result, more peer punishment and lower payoffs.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000099

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@article{lawrence2021,
  title        = {{Inequality and Peer Punishment in a Common-Pool Resource Experiment}},
  author       = {Lawrence R. De Geest & David C. Kingsley},
  journal      = {Strategic Behavior and the Environment},
  year         = {2021},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000099},
}

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Inequality and Peer Punishment in a Common-Pool Resource Experiment

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Evidence weight

0.43

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.21 × 0.4 = 0.09
M · momentum0.80 × 0.15 = 0.12
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.