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An experimental study of decentralized matching

Federico Echenique et al.

Quantitative Economics2025https://doi.org/10.3982/qe2316article
AJG 4ABDC A*
Weight
0.44

Abstract

We present an experimental study of decentralized two‐sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary nonbinding match offers that get finalized when a period of market inactivity has elapsed. Several insights emerge. First, stable outcomes are prevalent. Second, while centralized clearinghouses commonly aim at implementing extremal stable matchings, our decentralized markets most frequently culminate in the median stable matching. Third, preferences' cardinal representations impact the stable partners with whom participants match. Last, the dynamics underlying our results exhibit strategic sophistication, with agents successfully avoiding cycles of blocking pairs.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3982/qe2316

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@article{federico2025,
  title        = {{An experimental study of decentralized matching}},
  author       = {Federico Echenique et al.},
  journal      = {Quantitative Economics},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3982/qe2316},
}

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An experimental study of decentralized matching

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Evidence weight

0.44

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.32 × 0.4 = 0.13
M · momentum0.57 × 0.15 = 0.09
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.