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Accountable Compensation: The Progressive Case for Stakeholder-Focused, Board-Empowering Executive Compensation Laws

Emily Barreca

Yale Journal on Regulation2020article
ABDC B
Weight
0.40

What the paper says

Shareholder primacy has long dominated American legal thought and politics across the ideological spectrum. Over the past several years, however, U.S. political progressives have begun to criticize shareholder primacy, arguing that corporations should also serve other stakeholders. This Note conducts the first academic analysis of this emerging movement’s executive compensation policy proposals. This Note finds that stakeholder-primacy progressives have failed to propose policies that would effectively regulate executive compensation. Given the connection between rising executive compensation and economic inequality, this finding is surprising and concerning. The final Part develops an original executive compensation policy proposal for the progressive stakeholder primacy movement.

4 citations

Cite this paper

@article{emily2020,
  title        = {{Accountable Compensation: The Progressive Case for Stakeholder-Focused, Board-Empowering Executive Compensation Laws}},
  author       = {Emily Barreca},
  journal      = {Yale Journal on Regulation},
  year         = {2020},
}

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Accountable Compensation: The Progressive Case for Stakeholder-Focused, Board-Empowering Executive Compensation Laws

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Evidence weight

0.40

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.13 × 0.4 = 0.05
M · momentum0.80 × 0.15 = 0.12
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.