Policy Levers for First-Contact Healthcare Provider Choice: A Discrete Choice Experiment in Shanghai’s Hierarchical Medical System

Yi Gong

Applied Health Economics and Health Policy2026https://doi.org/10.1007/s40258-026-01033-7article
AJG 1ABDC C
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

Price gradients are necessary but insufficient; coupling PHC-tilted financing with visible access/quality signals delivers the largest shift of mild first-contact care away from tertiary hospitals.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s40258-026-01033-7

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@article{yi2026,
  title        = {{Policy Levers for First-Contact Healthcare Provider Choice: A Discrete Choice Experiment in Shanghai’s Hierarchical Medical System}},
  author       = {Yi Gong},
  journal      = {Applied Health Economics and Health Policy},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s40258-026-01033-7},
}

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Policy Levers for First-Contact Healthcare Provider Choice: A Discrete Choice Experiment in Shanghai’s Hierarchical Medical System

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.