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Mutual Outsourcing Between Downstream Firms on Endogenous Competition

Kangsik Choi & Ki‐Dong Lee

Manchester School2025https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12518article
AJG 2ABDC B
Weight
0.37

What the paper says

ABSTRACT In vertically related markets with exclusive channels, we demonstrate endogenous choice of competition mode under mutual outsourcing between downstream manufacturers. In contrast to previous results, the upstream supplier charges the downstream manufacturer an input price lower (higher) than the unit production cost under Bertrand (Cournot) competition. Thus, asymmetric competition can emerge as equilibrium with the possibility of achieving the highest social welfare when the level of product differentiation is moderate. Finally, when the degree of differentiation is low (high), Bertrand (Cournot) competition emerges as equilibrium, leading to Pareto efficiency (prisoner's dilemma) under fierce (mild) competition.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12518

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@article{kangsik2025,
  title        = {{Mutual Outsourcing Between Downstream Firms on Endogenous Competition}},
  author       = {Kangsik Choi & Ki‐Dong Lee},
  journal      = {Manchester School},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12518},
}

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Mutual Outsourcing Between Downstream Firms on Endogenous Competition

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Evidence weight

0.37

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06
M · momentum0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.