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Contests With Delegation

Francesco Trevisan

Journal of Public Economic Theory2026https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70091article
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.50

Abstract

This paper studies winner‐takes‐all Tullock contests between two groups, each formed by a principal and a delegate. Principals allocate the monetary prize within their group, while delegates exert effort to win it. In equilibrium, the more productive delegate receives a smaller prize share while enjoying a higher expected payoff. Nevertheless, delegates' expected payoffs do not monotonically increase with their productivity. As productivity differences get wide enough, delegates' expected payoffs decline and tend to zero. Finally, a more balanced competition raises both delegates' efforts and prize shares, ultimately benefiting delegates' utilitarian welfare.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70091

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@article{francesco2026,
  title        = {{Contests With Delegation}},
  author       = {Francesco Trevisan},
  journal      = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70091},
}

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Contests With Delegation

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.