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Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Envy-Freeness vs. Efficiency Revisited

Steven J. Brams et al.

Games2026https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010004article
AJG 1ABDC B
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

We study conflicts between envy-based fairness and efficiency for allocating indivisible items under additive utilities. We formalize several small, transparent instances showing that standard envy-freeness (EF) or its relaxations EFX and EFX0—i.e., envy-freeness up to any item, where EFX restricts attention to positively valued items and EFX0 allows removing zero-valued items as well—can conflict with Pareto-optimality (PO), maximin (MM), or maximum Nash welfare (MNW). Normatively, we argue that envy-freeness (even as EFX or EFX0) is not a panacea for allocating indivisible items and should be weighed against efficiency and welfare criteria.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010004

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@article{steven2026,
  title        = {{Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Envy-Freeness vs. Efficiency Revisited}},
  author       = {Steven J. Brams et al.},
  journal      = {Games},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010004},
}

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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