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Signaling Vision: Knowing When to Quit

Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen

International Economic Review2026https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70066article
AJG 4ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We study a signaling game where agents signal their type by choosing when to quit pursuing an uncertain project. High types observe news about project quality and quit when bad news arrives. Low types who do not observe any news may mimic high types by quitting continuously over a phase of time. The reputation dynamics may exhibit nonmonotonicity with respect to quitting time. Our analysis offers a unifying explanation for how and when both early and late quitting can enhance reputation and suggests novel welfare and policy implications.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70066

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@article{junichiro2026,
  title        = {{Signaling Vision: Knowing When to Quit}},
  author       = {Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen},
  journal      = {International Economic Review},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70066},
}

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Signaling Vision: Knowing When to Quit

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.