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An experimental investigation of the calculus of consent

Adam Hoffer & M. Scott Niederjohn

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice2025https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2025d000000025article
ABDC C
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate group decision-making, inspired by a model from Buchanan and Tullock’s The Calculus of Consent . Unlike previous researchers, we move beyond simple majority and unanimity rules, allowing groups to choose voting rules endogenously. The results of our experiment are consistent with the Buchanan–Tullock model. In particular, we confirm a tendency toward less restrictive voting rules when decision-making costs are high and external costs are low. We also find that less restrictive voting rules lead to higher group profits.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2025d000000025

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@article{adam2025,
  title        = {{An experimental investigation of the calculus of consent}},
  author       = {Adam Hoffer & M. Scott Niederjohn},
  journal      = {Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1332/25156918y2025d000000025},
}

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An experimental investigation of the calculus of consent

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.