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Majority vote on educational standards

Robert Schwager

Education Economics2025https://doi.org/10.1080/09645292.2025.2466611article
AJG 1ABDC B
Weight
0.37

What the paper says

The direct democratic choice of an examination standard, i.e., a performance level required to graduate, is evaluated against a utilitarian welfare function. It is shown that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low if the marginal cost of reaching a higher performance reacts more sensitively to ability for high than for low abilities, and if the right tail of the ability distribution is longer than the left tail. Moreover, a high number of agents who choose not to graduate may imply that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low even if these conditions fail.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/09645292.2025.2466611

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@article{robert2025,
  title        = {{Majority vote on educational standards}},
  author       = {Robert Schwager},
  journal      = {Education Economics},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/09645292.2025.2466611},
}

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Majority vote on educational standards

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Evidence weight

0.37

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06
M · momentum0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.