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The Limits of Moral Limitations: Reconceptualizing “Morals” in Human Rights Law

Ryan Thoreson

Harvard International Law Journal2018article
ABDC A
Weight
0.54

Abstract

Each of the major human rights instruments from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights onwards has reserved the state’s ability to curtail some rights in the name of interests in national security, public health, public order, and morals. These instruments do not define “morals,” however, and the growing recognition that sexual rights are human rights has made the deferential application of these limitation clauses increasingly untenable. As regional and international institutions struggle to make sense of moral limitations, this Article argues that constitutional morality, a concept developed by domestic courts in the Global South, offers a promising doctrinal tool to adjudicate disputes over sovereignty and sexual rights.

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Cite this paper

@article{ryan2018,
  title        = {{The Limits of Moral Limitations: Reconceptualizing “Morals” in Human Rights Law}},
  author       = {Ryan Thoreson},
  journal      = {Harvard International Law Journal},
  year         = {2018},
}

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The Limits of Moral Limitations: Reconceptualizing “Morals” in Human Rights Law

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Evidence weight

0.54

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.80 × 0.15 = 0.12
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.