Dollar dominance, de-dollarization, and international law
Francisco José López Quintana
Abstract
Recent proposals to seize Russian Central Bank assets expose how little international lawyers have engaged with the intensifying competition over global monetary governance. This article addresses this gap by reframing the global dominance of the US dollar and emerging de-dollarization efforts as competing legal institutions. First, the article reconstructs dollar dominance as a network of legal norms, practices, and institutional arrangements that sustain unequal global relations. Secondly, it shows how BRICS states are developing legal tools and institutional innovations to reduce their exposure to the US dollar. These initiatives will not topple dollar dominance anytime soon, but they already illustrate a shift: major emerging economies are using law and infrastructure to claim greater economic autonomy. This unfolding contest compels international lawyers to confront how changing geographies, technologies, and distributive claims could reshape core norms and institutions of international law and global governance.
1 citation
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06 |
| M · momentum | 0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.