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Motivation in All‐Pay Contests

Yung‐Shiang Jasmine Yang

Journal of Public Economic Theory2026https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70100article
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.50

Abstract

This paper studies how agents with monetary and non‐monetary motivation interact strategically in competitions. Examining the question under an all‐pay contest framework, we show that there do not exist pure‐strategy equilibria when the competing agents share the same motivation. When agents with different motivation compete against each other, we determine the conditions for the existence of pure‐strategy equilibria and fully characterize the mixed‐strategy equilibria. The results help explain situations where prizes are ineffective in eliciting higher efforts in contests. They show that the discouragement effect is prevalent when competing agents harbor different motivation and illustrate how reputation and money can be complementary goods.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70100

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@article{yung‐shiang2026,
  title        = {{Motivation in All‐Pay Contests}},
  author       = {Yung‐Shiang Jasmine Yang},
  journal      = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70100},
}

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Motivation in All‐Pay Contests

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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